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FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1980
MERLIN G. BRINER*
INTRODUCTION
F EDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1980 is the eighth af an annual
series of articles to be published in the AKRON LAW REVIEW. The
scope of this survey is limited to the substantive developments in the field
of income taxation. The thrust of this article is not only to identify new
developments, but also to trace these concepts through their formulative
changes.
Given the volatile nature of taxation, it is crucial for the practitioner
in this field to remain current with the changes which have occurred dur-
ing the year. Research of this article includes cases decided through August
31, 1980.
In an attempt to minimize the lead time between research and pub-
lication, this author has engaged the most able assistance of several members
of the AKRON LAW REVIEW. Without their substantial contributions and
cumplete dedication, this article would not have been possible. The author,
therefore, wishes to recognize and thank the following members of the
AKRON LAW REVIEW, for their efforts in researching, writing and compiling
this article Alan J. Tobin, Richard P. Hodge, William R. Meyers, Kevin C.
O'Neil, Kevin L. Pelanda, and David A. Shepherd. Special appreciation
is extended to Alan J. Tobin.
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1.00 Income
1.01 Meal Allowance
Early this year the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of
Hotel Conquistador, Inc. v. United States.' The issue involved in the case
was whether employers are required to pay federal social security taxes
(FICA) and federal unemployment taxes (FUTA) on meals furnished to
employees on the employer's premises. The Court of Claims determined that
such meals did not constitute remuneration when furnished for the em-
ployer's convenience."
Meals were served to employees of the Tropicana Hotel in Las Vegas
during working hours in the hotel cafeteria. Hotel policy provided that
meals be furnished at reduced prices or free of charge to qualified em-
ployees. The Court of Claims found such meals were furnished for the
convenience of the employer, that is, in order to keep employees on the
premises. As such, these meals were not part of the employees' wages and
their value could not be used for the purpose of computing FICA or FUTA
taxes.' As a result, the hotel was granted a refund on FICA and FUTA
taxes paid on such included meals.
It should be noted that the refund criteria under the Conquistador
case differs from the criteria for exclusion from gross income under section
119.' Under section 119, the furnishing of meals and lodging to an em-
ployee or his spouse and dependents is excludable from gross income as
long as it is for the convenience of the employer. Also, such meals and/
or lodging must be furnished in kind and on the employer's premises and,
in the case of lodging, it must be a condition of employment.
When considering whether to request a refund, one should look to
the value of the meals as related to total compensation and the existence
of any substantial conditions precedent to receiving such meals. If these
facts indicate that the meals were meant to be additional remuneration, then
a refund request may not be in order.
1.02 Dividend and Interest Exclusion
The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act increases the dividend ex-
clusion and extends the exclusion to apply to certain types of interest for the
tax years 1981 and 1982.' The Act increases the dividend exclusion to $200
for individual taxpayers, and increases the exclusion for married couples filing
1 597 F.2d 1348 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 702 (1980).
2d. at 1350.
3ld.
,'See Int. Rev. Code of 1954. All subsequent references to code sections are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.
5 Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980).
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jointly up to $400. This $400 limit for married couples filing jointly will apply
without regard to which spouse receives the interest or dividend income.6
The exclusion will also extend to certain types of interest from domestic
sources earned by individuals, with the same $200 and $400 limitations.
The most common types of interest that will be eligible for the exclusion
are interest received from a bank or savings and loan association or credit
union, and interest on bonds issued by a domestic corporation in registered
form.
2.00 Deductions
2.01 Attenuated Business Expenses
The Tax Court, in Harold Dancer v. Commissioner,7 distinguished
the longstanding Freedman8 case in the area of attenuated business ex-
pense deductions. In Dancer, the taxpayer was faced with a $140,000
judgment stemming from an automobile accident. Dancer's insurance car-
rier satisfied $100,000 of the judgment, leaving Dancer to pay the remain-
ing $40,000. Upon payment, Dancer deducted the $40,000 under section
162 as an ordinary and necessary business expense. The Service disallowed
the deduction arguing an absence of business intent in the taxpayer's travel.
Dancer, as a horse trainer, had three business locations, his farm, his home
and stable, and the racetrack. The accident in question occurred as he trav-
eled from his farm to his home, where he was to have lunch and attend to his
horses.
The Fifth Circuit in Freedman had disallowed a business deduction
of money paid to satisfy a judgment arising out of an auto accident." The
deduction was disallowed because the accident occurred while the taxpayer
was traveling between two unrelated business ventures. The Fifth Circuit
found the accident to be merely incidental to the travel and to have no
connection with either business.
The Tax Court determined that Dancer's trip was between two loca-
tions of one business as distinguished from Freedman's travel between two
unrelated business ventures. The Tax Court, in allowing the business de-
duction in Dancer, looked to the intent of the taxpayer in making the trip.
It is important to note that, in concurring opinions, seven judges ex-
pressed the belief that Freedman should have been overruled totally in
order to avoid confusion in the application of the Dancer decision, and
thus keep future cases out of court.
6 Id. at § 404.
7 73 T.C. 1103 (1980).
8 Freedman v. Comm'r, 35 T.C. 1179 (1961), affd at 301 F.2. 359 (5th Cir. 1962).
9ld. at 1181.
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2.02 Depreciation-Going Concern Value
The Sixth Circuit"0 and the Tax Court' recently established that the
going concern value, in the purchase of an ongoing business, can not be
allocated to a tangible depreciable asset for depreciation purposes. This
position was taken with respect to the 1964 purchase of the K-D Lamp
Division of the Dupean Corporation by Concord Control. The Tax Court
went on to determine that, at the time of the K-D purchase, no valuable
goodwill existed due to the highly competitive nature of K-D's business.
Both the Sixth Circuit and the Tax Court agreed that at the time of the
transaction K-D possessed a trained staff and an established product line
ready for sale in addition to depreciable equipment. The Tax Court de-
fined going concern value as "the increase in the value of assets due to
their existence as an integral part of an ongoing business. '"12
The decision by the Sixth Circuit points out the inconsistency among
the circuits. The Tenth Circuit has held that the cost of depreciable property
can include going concern value. 3 This position is directly opposed to that
taken by the Sixth, Eighth 4 and Ninth 5 Circuits which hold that the de-
preciable basis of assets should not include going concern value. An early
resolution of this conflict is needed to aid in the valuation of purchased
ongoing business operations.
2.03 Illegal Cash Rebates
Section 162(c) (2) bars a business expense deduction for illegal bribes
or kickbacks which subject the payor to a criminal penalty or loss of license
or privilege to engage in a trade or business.
The Tax Court in Pittsburgh Milk Co. v. Commissioner" decided that
illegal rebates in cash or kind were part of the cost of goods sold and
therefore proper to reduce gross income. The court felt that to exclude
these rebates from the cost of goods sold would be imposing a tax on
gross receipts which is not allowed under the income tax law. Only the
actual gross income can be subject to income tax.
In 1976, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 77-24411 which declared
that illegal payments within the meaning of section 162(c)(2) of the
Code may not be subtracted from gross sales to determine gross income.
Therefore, where the taxpayer bills milk to retailers at the fixed minimum
10Concord Control, Inc. v. Comm'r, 615 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1980).
"Concord Control, Inc., 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 76, 301 (1976).
12 Id. at 1333.
Is Comm'r v. Texas - Empire Pipe Co., 176 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1949).
", Northern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 470 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1973).
'2 United States v. Cornish, 348 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1965).
10 26 T.C. 707 (1956).
7 1977-2 C.B. 58.
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price as determined by state law, but gives rebates in violation of the
law to bring the price below the minimum, no deduction will be allowed
for the rebates whether in cash or kind. Since the payments would be dis-
allowed as a business expense, they will also be disallowed as a reduction
of gross income. Furthermore, Treasury Regulation 1.61(3) (a) determines
gross income without the subtraction of amounts disallowed under section
162(c) in the case of a business expense.
The Service's position has been tested in three cases since Revenue
Ruling 77-24418 was issued. In Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors v. Com-
missioner a wholesale liquor dealer sold twelve bottles of wine at the mini-
mum fixed price set by the state and later gave one extra bottle free. The
extra bottle of wine was given to avoid the price controls set by the state.
The Service claimed that the dealer could not deduct the cost of the extra
bottle of wine as a cost of goods sold or a deduction from gross receipts
since it was an illegal payment barred by section 162(c) (2). The Tax
Court disagreed and followed the Pittsburgh Milk decision in deciding that
the illegal payments were not barred by section 162(c) (2) because the
payments were deducted from sales to arrive at gross income.
The same reasoning was followed by The Tax Court in two other cases in-
volving the payment of cash rebates. In Haas Brothers, Inc. v. Commissioner"
a wholesale liquor dealer gave cash rebates instead of merchandise rebates.
The Tax Court decided that the cash rebates were not distinguishable from
the merchandise rebates. Further, the Tax Court said that the rebates were
part of the actual sales transaction and should be treated as a reduction
in gross income instead of a business deduction under Section 162.
The Tax Court has followed Haas Brothers in a 1980 case, Dixie
Dairies Corporation v. Commissioner," which involved illegal cash rebates
paid by milk wholesalers. The court here again looked at the economic
realities of the transaction, finding that the rebates were part of the actual
sales transaction instead of a business deduction. Still, the issue of illegal
rebates has not yet been fully resolved; Max Sobel is currently on appeal to
the Ninth Circuit.
3.00 Exemptions
4.00 Deductions
4.01 Education Expenses--Psychoanalysis
Education expenses may be deductible as ordinary and necessary
is id.
19 69 T.C. 477 (1977).
20 73 T.C. 1217 (1980).
21 74 T.C. No. 34, Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (P-H) 74.34 (1980).
[Vol. 14:2
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business expenses if the education maintains or improves skills required by
the taxpayer in his employment or other trade or business, or meets the
express requirements of the individual's employer..2 However, even if the
educational expenses meet the above requirements, they will not be de-
ductible if they are required of the taxpayer to meet the minimum educa-
tional requirements for qualification in his employment or other trade or
business, or if they qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business.
In Harry H. Voig, 2 1 the taxpayer, a clinical social worker, decided
to undergo psychoanalysis to improve her skills as a psychotherapist. The
psychoanalysis was not taken at an accredited psychoanalytic institute. The
taxpayer deducted the cost of the psychoanalysis as an educational expense.
The Service argued that the taxpayer's educational expenses were not
deductible because they: 1) were undertaken to meet the minimum re-
quirements of her employer; 2) were taken to qualify the taxpayer for a
new trade or business; and, 3) were not directly and proximately related
to improving skills required for taxpayer's employment.
In an earlier Tax Court case,2 a practicing physician specializing in
internal medicine had voluntarily taken courses in psychoanalysis although
the courses were not required in order to retain his job. The court there
held that such educational expenses were deductible because the physician
improved his skills enabling him to do a more competent job. Furthermore,
the skills that he acquired did not qualify him for a new specialty, but
merely sharpened his skills in internal medicine.
In the instant case, psychoanalysis was not necessary for the taxpayer
to meet the requirements of being a clinical social worker. The psycho-
analysis was a program to improve the taxpayer's skills at the job and was
not merely for self-improvement. Such programs do not have to be limited
to formal education since Treasury Regulation 1.162-5(b) implicitly ac-
knowledges the educational nature of psychoanalysis.
In addition, the psychoanalysis did not qualify the taxpayer for any
new licenses nor was it a prerequisite for obtaining employment as a clinical
social worker. The taxpayer continued her employment as a clinical social
worker while undergoing psychoanalysis. Treasury Regulation 1.162-5(b)
(3) states that an employer-directed change of duties does not constitute
a new trade or business if the new duties involve the same general type of
work as is involved in the taxpayer's present employment. Although the
taxpayer improved her skills for treating her patients, her duties after the
22Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a).
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2) & (3).
24 74 T.C. No. 9, Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (P-H) 1 74.09 (1980).
2 Watson v. Cornm'r, 31 T.C. 1014 (1959).
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training involved the same general type of work as before. The training
did not qualify her for a new trade or business.
The psychoanalysis was an educational expense having a direct and
proximate relationship to her employment. The taxpayer benefited from
the psychoanalysis by acquiring skills that separated her own personality
conflicts from that of her patients so that she could better diagnose and
treat her patients. Furthermore, the taxpayer received more referrals from
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals after undergoing psycho-
analysis. Since this integral relationship between the taxpayer's employment
and the educational expense existed, the cost of psychoanalysis was properly
deductible as an educational expense. It did not affect the outcome that
the taxpayer obtained reimbursement from her medical insurance carrier
for a portion of the cost of the analysis.
Even if the psychoanalysis had not been deductible as an educational
expense it could have been deductible as a medical expense if undertaken
to alleviate a mental illness.
4.02 Penalty Damages
As a general rule, fines and penalties paid to the government for the
violation of a statutory provision are not deductible as an ordinary and
necessary business expense."0 In Adolf Meller Co. v. United States, 27 the
Court of Claims disallowed a $43,000 deduction claimed by taxpayer under
section 162 as a trade or business expense. In Meller, the taxpayer had syn-
thetic gemstones mailed into the country to avoid customs delays. The Dis-
trict Director of Customs assessed a substantial civil penalty against the
taxpayer under section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930 " alleging importa-
tion of commercial shipments by means of false statements. The taxpayer
paid a negotiated settlement of $43,000 and deducted it on his 1972 tax
return as a section 162 business expense. The Service disallowed the de-
duction citing Treasury Regulation 1.162-21(b)(1)(iii). That regulation
allows no deduction for amounts paid in settlement of a taxpayer's po-
tential liability under a civil penalty. Meller was the first case to test the
validity of Regulation 1.162-21(b)(1)(iii). The Court of Claims found
the settlement to be non-deductible and thus upheld the validity of the
regulation.
In contrast, the Tax Court in Middle Atlantic Distributors, Inc. v.
Commissioner"0 held that a penalty which is remedial in nature can be
deducted as a business expense. In this case, the penalty was charged against
ZeTreas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(1)(iii).
27 600 F.2d 1360 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
2819 U.S.C. § 1592 (1976).
2972 T.C. 1136 (1979).
[Vol. 14:2
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the taxpayer by the Customs Service as liquidated damages on a penalty
against goods. The Service claimed that payment of such penalty could not be
deducted because it was a compromise of potential liability. The taxpayer
characterized the settlement as deductible liquidated damages. The Tax Court
based its decision on the difference between compensatory and quasi-criminal
penalties, finding compensatory penalties in certain cases to be deductible
as business expenses. Middle Atlantic was distinguished from Meller on the
grounds that although the court upheld the validity of the Treasury Regula-
tion, the Middle Atlantic court only interpreted it as not applying to this
particular set of facts.
4.03 Tax Shelter
Tax shelters are being closely scrutinized by the Service and those
shelters which are abusive are suffering from adverse decisions in Revenue
Rulings. One of the primary considerations in determining what is abusive
is how the taxpayer determines the value of an asset. Where the valuation
is extraordinarily high, the shelter and its depreciation or tax investment
credit will come under severe attack."°
A number of recent Revenue Rulings concerning tax shelters have
been issued within the past year. Revenue Rulings 79-41931 and 80-69"
deal with the valuation of an asset by a taxpayer and the section 170 de-
duction for contributions and gifts given to or for the use of a charitable
organization.
The first ruling involved a taxpayer who purchased "art" books in
a foreign country at a substantial discount. He imported the "art" books,
stored them for over twelve months, and then donated the books to a
charitable organization. The taxpayer claimed a deduction of the retail list
price of the books in the foreign country, rather than their actual cost or fair
market value in this country.
The second ruling dealt with a similar fact pattern. The taxpayer held
assorted gems for slightly over one year and then donated them to a
charitable organization. The taxpayer claimed that the value of the gems
was three times the purchase price, the value the promoter had stated the
gems would be worth one year from purchase.
In making its decision in both cases the Service relied on Treasury
Regulation 1-170A- (c) (1 ). It first determined that where a charitable con-
tribution consists of property, as it did in these cases, the amount of con-
tribution is the fair market value of the property at the time of contribution.
Because of the abusive nature of these transactions, the Service also relied
80 Estate of Franklin v. Comm'r, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
n 1979-2 C.B. 107.
32 1980-11 I.R.B. 5.
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on section 170(e)(1) which allows the Commissioner to rule that the
donor's activity was sufficiently similar to the activity of a dealer selling in
the ordinary course of business and the contribution would then be treated
as ordinary income property which barred a deduction for any appreciation
and limits any deduction to the donor's cost."
The taxpayer with the "art" book shelter was considered a dealer for
tax purposes. Thus, in this situation, if a taxpayer proves that the fair mar-
ket value exceeds his basis, his charitable contributions must be reduced
by the amount of gain not recognizable as long-term capital gain. The tax-
payer with the "gems" shelter was allowed to deduct only the amount that
he paid for them. Under Treasury Regulation 1.170A-1 (c) (2), the valu-
ation of the item to be donated to the charitable organization must be de-
termined from the best evidence of what the maximum fair market value
would be. The taxpayer's showing was based primarily on what the promoter
of the gems said their value would be. The Service felt that this was merely
speculative and that the price paid was the "best" evidence of the gems'
value.
A third type of "art tax shelter" has also come under close scrutiny
by the Service. In Revenue Ruling 79-432"' the taxpayer purchased from
an artist a lithographic plate along with a specified number of prints or the
rights to make a specified number of prints from the plate. Here the tax-
payer gave the artist $30,000 in cash and $170,000 in a nonrecourse note.
The shelter works by attributing the entire cost to the lithographic plate
and then claiming both an investment credit and depreciation on the plate.
However, the Service will not allow such treatment." Based on expert
opinion, it was determined that the real item of value was the right to a
number of limited-edition prints. From the evidence the Service determined
those rights to be worth $30,000, the amount the taxpayer had paid, and
that no more than $1,000 could be attributed to the plate. The taxpayer
was denied both the depreciation deduction and the investment credit
under several arguments made by the Service. First, since the Service
does not recognize any determinable life for the value of an art object,
no depreciation or investment credit can be taken. Second, since the plate
has little if any value after the specified number of prints are made, the
plate's basis is absorbed in the cost of the prints. As a result, the money
expended for payment of the plate would not qualify for an investment
credit. Third, the Service could determine that the taxpayer's activity was
33 See Rev. Rul. 79-256, 1979-2 C.B. 105.
34 1979-2 C.B. 289.
35 See F. & D. Rentals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 335 (1965).
36 See Rev. Rul. 68-232, 1968-1 C.B. 79; John R. Thompson Co. v. United States, 338 F.
Supp. 770 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aft'd, 447 F,2d 164 (7th Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 14:2
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sufficiently similar to the activity of a dealer selling prints. Therefore, these
limited-edition prints would be stock-in-trade and neither depreciation nor
investment credit could be taken.
Those tax shelters dealing with oil, gas, and gold have also come
under close scrutiny. Particular emphasis has been placed on shelters where
the deduction results in a substantial distortion of income, where nonre-
course notes are involved, or where the taxpayer's investment is not at
risk, areas that three Revenue Rulings dealt with in 1980. In Revenue
Ruling 80-7111 a limited partnership formed to explore and develop oil
and gas fields had numerous limited partners who each invested approxi-
mately $1,000 in the shelter. The general partner was a corporation whose
parent was a general contractor and was responsible for the development
of the wells. The tax advantage involved the allocation of the deduction
for both intangible drilling and development costs to the limited partners.
The problem arose for the taxpayer in that the expenses sought to be de-
ducted were prepaid to the general partner and contractor, but the con-
tractor had not yet begun development. Under Treasury Regulation 1.461-1
(a) the Service determined that since the limited partners had no income
for the year of the deduction and that the prepayment was in fact an
asset having a useful life extending beyond the taxable year, these pre-
payments were not deductible in this tax year. If it were allowed, the
transaction would not clearly reflect income as required under sections
446 and 461. The deduction can be taken in those tax years where pay-
ments are made to the general contractor in accordance with customary
business practice.
Revenue Ruling 80-72-" involved a taxpayer who had invested in a
foreign gold mine. The promoter for the shelter arranged for the taxpayer
to lease an interest in a gold reserve which included the mineral rights to
the gold. The promoter would then sell an option under the taxpayer's
lease on gold to be extracted, on the condition that the option could only
be exercised when gold was extracted and the owner of the option could
not compel extraction. The money paid for the option would be used to
develop the mine. Thus, the taxpayer had no obligation to the option
holder and his "at risk position" was tantamount to the situation where
the taxpayer had borrowed money on a nonrecourse basis. He was "ef-
fectively protected from any true economic risk." 9
While the Code allows deductions for the development of a gold mine
under section 616(a), the loss for any such venture is allowed only to
the extent the taxpayer is at risk as defined by section 465. Here, the tax-
87 1980-11 I.R.B. 7.
s8 1980-11 I.R.B. 9.
st Id.
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payer could only be considered at risk for money borrowed which he was
personally liable. Since this transaction was substantially similar to non-
recourse financing, the taxpayer was not at risk and could only deduct
amounts where the money had been expended in development, and com-
mercially marketable quantities of gold exist.
Revenue Ruling 80-7311 deals with mineral rights tax shelters and
nonrecourse financing. Here, the taxpayer entered into a lease agreement
where he obtained an "operating mineral interest" in property owned by
another party. As consideration the taxpayer agreed to pay by promissory
note a minimum advance royalty each year for the term of the lease. The
notes were "unsecured, nonrecourse, non-interest bearing, had no maturity
date, and . . . payable only to the extent of the proceeds from . . . sale
of minerals."'1 Taxpayer sought to deduct the amount of the advanced min-
eral royalties paid by the promissory note.
Under Treasury Regulation 1.612-3(b)(3) a deduction from gross
income can be taken for advanced mineral royalties in the year that it is
paid. However, the deduction is not allowed where the payment of royalties,
as was the case here, is contingent upon whether the minerals are extracted
and sold. Since the royalty payments were contingent and the giving of
a nonrecourse note does not constitute payment, no deduction was allowed.
The Service has also given close scrutiny to "trust type" tax shelters.
In two recent rulings the primary attack on the shelters was based on an
examination of the actual substance of the transaction rather than an ac-
ceptance of the form set up by the taxpayer. In both cases the Service dis-
allowed the trust and attributed all the sheltered income to the taxpayer.
The taxpayer in Revenue Ruling 80-74,2 attended a meeting where
a promoter for a tax shelter explained a "foreign tax haven double trust."
The promoter stated the double trust would "reduce or eliminate...
income tax liabilities . . . [and] . . . provide . . . benefits such as avoid-
ance of probate, elimination of federal estate and gift tax . . . and avoid-
ance of various state and local taxes.' The promoter acting as the taxpayer's
agent would create a trust consisting of income producing property in the
name of the taxpayer. The promoter-agent would then create a second
trust in the foreign country naming the first trust as trustee. This second
trust retains the income of the first trust and at times distributes it to the
taxpayer and his family. The taxpayer continues to manage the property
as he had done prior to the trust's creation and his being named trustee.
0 1980-11 I.R.B. 10.
41 Id.
4 1980-11 I.R.B. 13,
43 Id.
[Vol. 14:2
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Section 7701 (a) (31 ) states that the income from a foreign trust which
is not connected with a trade or business within the United States is not
includable in gross income of the individual taxpayer. However, where the
grantor has not given up ownership and control of the assets, as is the
case here, under section 671, those "items of income, deductions, and cred-
its" are included in the taxpayers taxable income. Neither can the taxpayer
take a deduction for the costs of the trust."
The second tax shelter "trust" was ruled upon in Revenue Ruling 80-
75,"1 where several taxpayers paid money into a trust for which they would
receive income and interest with any remainder passing to a designated
person. The trustee was given the power to engage in business and used
the sum paid into the trust to purchase a patent. The beneficiaries sought
to deduct any depreciation or amortization that involved the trust property.
They also attempted to avoid the "at risk of loss" limitations under section
465 concerning the depreciation.""
Under Treasury Regulation 301.7701-2(a) (1) the Commissioner is
given the power to determine for federal tax purposes the real substance
of a trust which greatly resembles a corporation. To determine if this trust
would be upheld or found to be a business association the Service looked
at whether there were associates, whether there was an objective to carry
on a business, and whether there was an intent to divide the gains of the
venture. From the facts the Service determined that these taxpayers were
associates by virtue of their contributions, the objective was to carry on a
business dealing with the patent, and the associates intended to utilize
the gains of the venture. This "trust" was thus classed as a "business or
commercial trust" whose primary purpose was to run a business for profit.
Because of this classification for federal tax purposes, the "beneficiaries" were
not allowed to deduct depreciation or amortization of the property held by
the association.
5.00 Tax Deductions
5.01 Investment Tax Credit
In a recent Letter Ruling"7 the Service held that a purchase of medical
equipment by a taxpayer, after it had been leased by his wholly-owned cor-
poration for a three month trial period, did not qualify for investment credit.
Under section 46(c) (1 ) only "new" or "used section 38 property" qualifies
4"Rev. Rul. 80-74, 1980-11 I.R.B. at 14.
45 Rev. Rul. 80-75, 1980-11 I.R.B. 26.
" ld.
47 Letter Ruling 8002126 (1978).
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for the credit. In this case the property did not qualify as new property be-
cause its "original use" did not commence with the taxpayer."'
In the Letter Ruling the Service also held that the equipment did
not qualify as used property. Property does not qualify if, after its ac-
quisition, "it is used by (a) a person who used such property before such
acquisition, or (b) a person who bears a relationship described in section
179(d) (2) (A) or (B) to a person who used such property before such
acquisition.""9 In this case section 179(d) (2) (A) relates to section 267
(b) (2) under which an individual and a corporation of which he owns
more than fifty percent of the value of the outstanding stock therein are
considered related. Since the taxpayer in this case owned all of the out-
standing stock of his corporation, he and his corporation were considered
related; thus, since the corporation had used the property for three months
prior to the time when the taxpayer purchased it, it could not qualify
as used property. Although property is not considered used by a person
prior to acquisition, if it is used only on a casual basis, the service held that
the three month trial period could not be considered casual use.
If after the trial period, taxpayer purchased new equipment other than
that leased or used during the trial period, the investment credit would
still be applicable. The credit rights could also be salvaged if the equipment
was purchased at the outset with an option to rescind within a stated trial
period. The latter option, however, might require the taxpayer to obtain
financing before making the final decision to keep the new equipment.
5.02 Energy Credits
The Windfall Profit Tax Act50 has made certain important changes
that liberalize the residential energy credits available. The first major step
was to increase the current nonrefundable energy credit for those expendi-
tures made in acquiring renewable energy source equipment installed in
a taxpayer's principal residence." Under prior law"2 the maximum credit
available was $2,200. The present credit is forty percent of the first $10,000
of qualifying expenditures for a maximum credit of $4,000. This increased
tax credit is available after December 31, 1979.
The Act also allows two or more individuals who occupy different
dwelling units that are used as principal residences to apportion among
the individuals the qualified expenditures." The expenditures are to be ap-
'
5 See I.R.C. § 48(b)(2).
491d. § 48(c)(1).
50Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980).
51 ld. at § 202.
I.R.C. § 44C.
58 Windfall Profit Tax Act § 201.
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portioned among the individuals according to their contribution to the cost
if they share the installation costs and ownership of qualified conservation
property.
6.00 Depreciation
7.00 Gains and Losses
7.01 Nonrecognition--Principal Residence-Yacht
Section 1034(a) provides for the nonrecognition of gain from the sale
of a principal residence if another principal residence is purchased eighteen
months before or after the sale of the former. In a 1980 Letter Ruling,5' the
Service determined that a yacht qualified as a principal residence. The
Service placed great emphasis on Treasury Regulation 1.1034(c)(3)(i)
which lists as principal residences, a houseboat, a house trailer, and stock held
by a tenant-stockholder in a cooperative housing corporation. From this
ruling it is clear that section 1034(a) does not restrict the form that a prin-
cipal residence may take but, in order to qualify, it must contain facilities
for cooking, sleeping, and sanitation. The Service will look to the totality
of the circumstances, including the good faith of the taxpayer. Since a yacht
can be lived upon comfortably and may have the same conveniences that
would be found in a house, it can qualify as a principal residence.
8.00 Procedure
8.01 Attorney Fees
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 197651 empowers
courts to award reasonable attorney's fees to a party prevailing against the
United States in "any civil action or proceeding by or on behalf of the
United States. The Fifth Circuit in Key Buick Comp. v. Comm.Y recently
held that in order for an award of attorney's fees to be appropriate, the
United States must be the "moving or initiating party" in litigation. The
court held that the taxpayer could recover attorney's fees only where he
is a party-defendant in the action. Unfortunately for the taxpayer who is
contesting the deficiency notices, the Attorney's Fees Awards Act may be
of little help because "little, if any, consideration was given [by Congress]
to the fact that the taxpayer is only rarely the defendant in judicial pro-
ceedings."5 In Key Buick Co. the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
denial of Attorney's fees where taxpayer successfully contested nearly the
entire amount of deficiency notices totally $166,318. The court held how-
54Letter Ruling 8015017 (1980).
542 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
58 613 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1980).
a7 Id. at 1308.
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ever, that the Tax Court did have the power to award attorney's fees in
appropriate cases.
In Jones v. United States, 8 an opinion released the same day as Key
Buick Co., the Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's denial of attorney's
fees. In that case the Service had ruled that one of taxpayer's tree cutters
was an employee rather than a subcontractor and hence payments to said
tree cutter were subject to federal unemployment and Social Security taxes.
The taxpayer immediately paid the federal unemployment taxes of $54 but
did not pay the Social Security (FICA) taxes because the tree cutter had
already paid his own FICA and withholding taxes. The taxpayer also filed
refund claims for the federal unemployment taxes in the belief that the
tree cutter was in fact a subcontractor. Despite the fact that the law and
the facts clearly supported taxpayer's position regarding the FICA taxes,
the Service counterclaimed for FICA and withholding taxes in the amount
of $10,170. The Service later admitted that it had filed its counterclaim
far in excess of the amount due as an "attention getter." 9
The Fifth Circuit in Jones reversed the district court's denial of at-
torney's fees holding that by filing the counterclaim against the taxpayer,
the taxpayer became a defendant with respect that part of the action. Thus
consistent with Key Buick Co., an award of attorney's fees could be ap-
propriate. The Fifth Circuit also held that recovery of attorney's fees did
not require a showing of bad faith. Rather, there need only be a finding
that the government's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foun-
dation. 60
8.02 Audit Workpapers
Where a corporation is required to fie financial statements with the
SEC, the auditing CPA's must evaluate the sufficiency of the corporation's
reserves to cover any potential tax liability. In making this determination
the auditors assess the susceptibility to attack of all tax positions taken by
the corporation. The reports, known as tax accrual audit workpapers, are
at all times kept in strict confidence.
The First Circuit, in a decision that could have far reaching conse-
quences for CPA's and their large corporate clients, upheld a trial court's
order requiring Arthur Anderson & Co. to produce the tax accrual audit
workpapers in connection with an Internal Revenue Service review of one
of its clients. In the case of Arthur Anderson & Co. v. United States,61 the
American Institute of Certified Public Accounts appeared as amicus curiae
58613 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1980).
591d. at 1314.
60 Id.
61 80-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 1 9360 (1st Cir. 1980).
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and warned the court of the "broad detrimental impact" that the availability
of such workpapers to the Service would have.62 These warnings fell upon
deaf ears, as the First Circuit dismissed the appeal.
After failing to obtain a stay of enforcement on the Service's sum-
mons pending appeal, Arthur Anderson complied by producing the work-
papers. Anderson's appeal on the enforcement of the summons was there-
fore rendered moot. Anderson's client's appeal, however, escaped mootness
because that portion of the summons commanding Anderson to testify had
not yet been executed. The First Circuit dismissed the client's argument
of accountant-client privilege citing Couch v. United States" where the
Supreme Court noted that no federal court had ever recognized such a
privilege. 4 The First Circuit refused to depart from "The general rule
[in order] to apply a privilege in this case."5
8.03 Handwriting Exemplars
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Euge" that the Service is
empowered to compel handwriting exemplars pursuant to its summons
authority under section 7602.
Euge had failed to file tax returns from 1973 through 1976. Upon
investigation by the Service, the agent found only two bank accounts regis-
tered in Euge's name. The agent, suspicious that Euge was concealing others,
uncovered twenty more accounts which related back to Euge but were
under various aliases. To determine whether the sums deposited were in
fact those of Euge, the agent issued a summons requiring Euge to appear
and execute handwriting exemplars of the various signatures. Euge would
not comply, and the district court ordered the samples. Then the court of
appeals reversed."'
On certiorari," the Supreme Court first looked to the common law
power to impose evidentiary obligations. It found handwriting exemplars
to be a form of evidence, "'like the body itself,' to be an 'identifying physical
characteristic subject to production'." ' As the statute gave no express
authorization to compel exemplars, the Court reasoned that in the absence
of an express prohibition or of substantial counterveiling congressional poli-
62/d.
63409 U.S. 322 (1973).
64United States v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 80-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9515 (1st Cir. 1980).
85 Id.
6 100 S. Ct. 874 (1980).
67 587 F.2d 25 (8th Cir. 1978).
68 The Sixth and Eight Circuits were in accord. United States v. Brown, 536 F.2d 117
(6th Cir. 1976). The Fourth Circuit disagreed. United States v. Rosinsky, 547 F.2d 249
(4th Cir. 1977).
e9 100 S. Ct. at 879 quoting Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
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cies the statute should be interpreted broadly. This was also in keeping with
precedent and other Code sections.
Euge and the dissenters interpreted the wording of section 7602 to
mean documents already in existence. As handwriting exemplars must be
created, the statute is inapplicable. Also rejected by the Court were
the contentions that handwriting exemplars are either a search or seizure
subject to fourth amendment protections or testimonial evidence protected
by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, the
Court held that in order to assure the effective performance by the Service
of a congressionally imposed responsibility, taxpayers may no longer refuse
to provide handwriting samples when under summons.70
8.04 Jury Awards
The Supreme Court in Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt7 decided
that the jury in a FELA 2 case must be instructed, on request, that damage
awards are not taxable. This decision will be of benefit to employers and
insurance carriers as awards will not be increased by the jury by the amount
of the anticipated taxes.
In 1973 a freight train fireman was killed when a locomotive collided
with a loaded hopper car. The Illinois trial court refused the defendant
railroad's requested jury instruction that "your award will not be subject
to any income taxes, and you should not consider such taxes in fixing the
amount of your awards." The appellate court affirmed" and appeal was
denied to the Illinois Supreme Court. The Supreme Court on certiorari
held that (1) it was error to exclude evidence of the income taxes payable
on the decedent's past and estimated future earnings, and (2) it was error
for the trial judge to refuse to instruct the jury that the award of damages
would not be subject to income taxation."4
The arguments by the respondent and the dissenting opinion that were
rejected or distinguished by the majority opinion included: the calculation
would be too speculative and too complex, gross earnings and not after-tax
figures should be used in projecting the decedent's contributions, costs of
litigation are equally pertinent to the determination of compensation, the
net effect is a windfall to the tortfeasor, and that these instructions are
governed by state law."5
The effect of taxation will now play a more significant role in determin-
70 100 S. Ct. at 879.
TI 100 S. Ct. 755 (1980).
72 Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
7862 Mll. App. 3d 653, 378 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).
1, 100 S. Ct. at 756.
75ld. at 755-63.
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ing jury awards. The scope of the decision potentially affects all awards,
not just those made under FELA. If juries, upon request, must be in-
formed of the tax consequences under section 104(a)(2) (the personal
injury exclusion), the effect will be a smaller award, as the award will not
be increased to reflect potential tax liability. Before the instant case, tax
consequences were usually kept from the jury. But now with the door
opened, both plaintiff and defendant will be requesting that their side of the
tax issue be heard.
8.05 Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations regarding the filing of tax returns applies
to three general categories: 1) correct return filed - three years;"' 2)
return filed which omits more than twenty-five percent of gross income-
six years;" 3) either a fraudulent return is filed or no return is filed-
statute does not run." In Powell v. Commissioner," the Tenth Circuit con-
sidered whether the filing of an amended return to an originally fraudulent
return, begins the general three year statute of limitations or still allows the
government to assess the tax at any time.
The Tenth Circuit determined that where a taxpayer originally files a
fraudulent return, the subsequent filing of an amended return begins the
general three year statute of limitation. 0 The Tenth Circuit followed the
reasoning of an earlier Tax Court case8 which was subsequently adopted
as Revenue Ruling 79-178,82 where a nonfraudulent amended return is filed,
it puts the Commissioner on notice and, absent a policy to the contrary, the
statute begins to run. Thus, where either a return is not filed or fraudently
filed, the subsequent filing of a correct amended return starts the general
three year statute of limitations.
8.06 Tainted Evidence
A tax evasion scheme pursued by the Service under the code name
"Operation Tradewinds"' resulted in several significant procedural cases,
the last of which brought the taxpayer to the United States Supreme Court.
In 1972, Castle Bank in the Bahamas was suspected by the Service of
shielding income for United States taxpayers.8" In order to determine the
names of persons using the bank, the Service, in the now famous "briefcase
76I.R.C. § 6 501(a).
77I.R.C. § 65 01(e).
78 I.R.C. § 6 501(c).
79614 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1980).
sold. at 1266.
81 See Bennett v. Comm'r, 30 T.C. 114 (1958).
82 1979-1 C.B. 3.
83 The investigation was also known as Project Haven and Project Decode.
8"The suspicion arose when a drug dealer, who was also a client of the Baskes firm, de-
posited a check in his bank account originally drawn on the Castle Bank.
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incident," employed a female detective to lure the vice-president of the
bank away from his apartment while the Service photographed the contents
of the briefcase. However, in so doing the agents broke off their quick-made
key in the lock. This led to the related cases of United States v. Payner,85
United States v. Baskes s and Kanter v. Internal Revenue Service."
In Baskes"8 the Service found attorney Baskes guilty of a conspiracy
scheme mastermined by Baskes to avoid paying income and gift taxes. Bas-
kes used the Castle Bank to set up a trust for a client using untaxed money,
then, in order to cover his footsteps, transferred a worthless mining claim
through several corporations and partnerships, the last of which, Fantasy-
Galaxie, claimed a large deduction on partnership losses for the money
actually in the trust.
Baskes first contended that the attorney-client privilege between
himself and the bank gave him standing to assert that the search and seiz-
ure was illegal under the fourth amendment. The district court rejected this
because the privilege exists for the benefit of the client (the Castle Bank)
and not the attorney. The court also held that the supervisory powers doc-
trine, which basically allows the court to exclude evidence tainted with
the poison of illegality, was inapplicable because it would circumvent the
fourth amendment standing requirements. 9
Two months later in Kanter,9 another partner in the Baskes firm,
Kanter, sought information from the Service concerning Operation Trade-
winds through the Freedom of Information Act.91 The court held that be-
cause the information was illegally obtained, the exemption for a law en-
forcement investigatory files did not apply and therefore the government
had to produce the documents.
Jack Payner, another taxpayer whose name was obtained through the
illegal search of Castle Bank customers, fought his way to the Supreme
Court only to have the Service emerge victorious and apparently the stronger
for it. The Supreme Court, in Payner,"2 ruled that "the interest in detering
illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the
instance of a party who is not the victim of the challenged practices.",
Evidence will not be excluded either on fourth amendment standing grounds
85 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
86433 F. Supp. 799 (N.D. I1. 1977).
87433 F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
88433 F. Supp. 799.
89 Id.
90433 F. Supp. 812.
915 U.S.C. § 552 (1978).
92 100 S. Ct. 2439.
-id. at 2442.
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or on prayers to the supervisory powers of the court. Supervisory powers,
the court said, are not as broad as "standing" and therefore this judiciary
discretionary power could not be used by the court to disregard the con-
sidered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing."
The dissent points out that: (1) the integrity of the courts will be
questioned; (2) standing will be used as a sword by the Service; and (3)
the government now and in the future could affirmatively counsel agents
to illegally search one individual to obtain evidence against a third party
who is the government's real target.' 5 The dissent also points out that the
only way the Service can benefit from the illegally obtained evidence is if
the information is admitted against the tax evaders. Previous restraints on
admitting tainted evidence had been abandoned, the dissent said, for the
Service may now act with a purposely illegal intention and "a bad faith
hostility to the constitutional rights,"" and yet the evidence gathered against
the third parties will still be admissable.
8.07 Tax Preparer's Negligence Penalties
The Service is proposing more penalties on preparers for negligent or
intentional disregard of rules and regulations pursuant to section 6694(a)
which imposes a one hundred dollar penalty for the understatement of the
tax liability. For the fiscal year ended 1979 (12 months ended September
30, 1979), the Service proposed 4474 negligence penalties and 417 willful
penalties. For the first half of fiscal year 1980 which ended on March 31,
1980, the Service has already proposed 4307 negligence penalties and 1735
willful penalties. At the present rate the number of proposed penalties for
fiscal year ended 1980 would more than double that of 1979.
Revenue Ruling 80-28'" involved three situations where the tax pre-
parers, a certified public accountant, a bank trust officer who is an at-
torney, and a public accountant, reported the capital gain but failed to
compute the minimum tax on the capital gain deduction. In each situation
the one hundred dollar penalty was imposed under section 6694(a).
In the first situation the preparer was aware of the minimum tax
provisions but believed that the taxpayer would have some basis in the
property sold and would later file an amended return. The preparer anti-
cipated at the time the return was filed that the basis in the property would
offset any minimum tax due.
The second situation involved the failure to report the minimum tax
because of an oversight by the preparer. The preparer contended that since
'Id.
95 Id. at 2447-8.
'161d. at 2450.
97 1980-4 I.R.B. 14.
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the capital gain on which the minimum tax was imposed was clearly set
out in the return there was no attempt to conceal or understate the minimum
tax.
In the third situation, the preparer claimed that he was not aware of
the minimum tax provisions.
Section 56 (a) provides for the imposition of an income tax on certain
items of tax preference. Section 57(a) (9) (A) specifically treats a capital
gain deduction as a tax preference item. All three preparers, however, did
not compute the minimum tax.
Regulation 1.6694-1(a)(5) places the burden of proof on the pre-
parer concerning whether he has negligently or intentionally disregarded
any rule or regulation with respect to preparing a return. Furthermore,
Regulation 1.6694-1 (a)( 1 ) states that a preparer is not considered to have
negligently or intentionally disregarded a rule or regulation if the preparer
exercises due diligence in an effort to apply the rules and regulations to
the information given to the preparer to determine the taxpayer's correct
liability for tax.
In the first situation, the preparer was aware of the minimum tax
provisions but did not compute the minimum tax because he believed that
the basis in the capital asset would offset the minimum tax. Since the pre-
parer did compute the capital gain without any basis, his belief that the
capital asset would have some basis is not supported by the facts and cir-
cumstances. Furthermore, if the preparer did not know what the basis
would be there is little support that the basis in the asset would offset the
minimum tax. The preparer, therefore, did not exercise due diligence and
the one hundred dollar penalty was imposed.
In the second situation, the preparer was aware of the minimum tax
provisions but because of an oversight failed to report the minimum tax.
Section 6694(a) does not require a delinquent act in order to constitute
negligence. If the preparer had exercised due care, then the minimum
tax would have been apparent. Therefore, the penalty was properly imposed
against the preparer.
In the third situation the preparer was not aware of the minimum
tax. The minimum tax is not an unusual term and is frequently encountered
by preparers. The instructions for an individual income tax return would
have indicated the existence of the minimum tax. If the preparer would
have made an adequate investigation he would have discovered it. Here,
the preparer's ignorance of the law is no defense to the imposition of the
penalty.
Preparers have complained about the proposal to increase penalties.
In the instructions for Schedule D, no mention is made of the minimum
[Vol. 14:2
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tax. However, in another part of the instructions the preparer is warned
of it. Although the idea that a preparer will be liable for a bona fide mis-
take may be disturbing, a diligent, well informed, and conscientious pro-
parer would probably not make these mistakes despite the fact that the
instructions are not clear and well organized.
Furthermore, preparers should be aware that infractions are accumu-
lated in the preparer's name and if a preparer accumulates a large number
of them, his returns may be subject to increased scrutinization.
8.08 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program
When the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in the case of
Internal Revenue Service v. Long. 8 the Court by its inaction may have
paved the way for widespread tax avoidance. The Service contended that
if, under the Freedom of Information Act,99 secret formulas used in the
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) are released the
Service's effectiveness would be compromised.
The TCMP is the system by which the Service selects for audit various
returns which are more likely to contain an understated tax liability. The
Service claims that if this information were to be released, the audit selection
formula could be determined and thus alert cheating taxpayers to avoid
audit signals. The effect of this would be to render the selective audit
procedure ineffective.
The decision by the Ninth Circuit found that the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act applies to IRS computer programs as well as to printed docu-
ments. The court went on to find that, under section 6103, information
which does not identify a particular taxpayer is disclosable to the public."'
These factors compelled the court to find in favor of disclosure of the
TCMP computer tapes. The effect of this ruling may be to provide the
fraudulent taxpayer with a checklist to avoid audit, thus seriously subverting
the Service's selective audit procedure. As such, it would have a devastating
effect on the viability of the self-reporting tax system.
9.00 Inventory
9.01 Inventory Writedowns
Revenue Procedure 80-51'1 outlines the procedures which the taxpayer
is required to make under the Supreme Court's decision in Thor Power
Tool Co. v. Commissioner"'2 which set forth the accounting methods used
98 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1851 (1980).
99 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1974).
100 596 F.2d at 362.
101 Rev. Proc. 80-5 (Republication), 1980-17 I.R.B. 23.
102 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
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in writing down excess inventory." 3 Thor upheld sections 446 and 471 which
allow the Commissioner to determine whether the method used in in-
ventory accounting is the best accounting practice and clearly reflects
the taxpayer's income.
In Thor, the corporation did not foresee any reasonable future de-
mand for its excess inventory and, as a result, wrote it down to "net realiz-
able value," which was approximately scrap value. However, they did not
scrap or sell the excess inventory at reduced prices. The Court held
that under section 471, when a taxpayer writes down excess inventory,
the value to be given that inventory should be designated at replacement
cost, unless the goods are scrapped, sold, or offered for sale at a lower
price. Since Thor had failed to do this, its accounting method for writing
down excess inventory was not allowed.'
Revenue Procedure 80-5 is divided into five parts, two of which are
significant. In part 3.01 of the Revenue Procedure, a blanket consent is
given by the Service to taxpayers allowing them to change their method of
excess inventory valuation to the method prescribed by the Commissioner.
The taxpayer is, in fact, required to make the changes retroactively and the
changes must take place in the first taxable year ending on or after Decem-
ber 25, 1979.
The changes can be made either voluntarily under part 3.04(1) or
involuntarily under part 3.05. In either case the taxpayer may use section
481(a) to cushion the effect of any additional tax. This section allows a
net adjustment to be made and prorated over the time period the taxpayer
had previously used an impermissible method. The only limitation placed
on the time period for the net adjustment is that it cannot exceed ten years.
Whether the taxpayer should adopt the change either voluntarily or
involuntarily depends upon the tax consequences sought. Where the net
adjustment shows a substantial increase in additional taxes and the tax-
payer has used the impermissible method for a number of years, it may
be advantageous to adopt the method voluntarily. In this way the additional
tax is spread out over a number of taxable years. Involuntary adoption
should be considered where the taxpayer has net operating loss carryovers.
The entire adjustment is included in the taxpayer's income for that year and
the net operating loss is used to offset the increase in taxable income.
However, if the taxpayer is already using or elects to use the last-in
first-out (LIFO) method for the first taxable year ending on or after Decem-
ber 25, 1979, the taxpayer is precluded from using the net adjustments
under section 481(a) by part 3.07 of the Revenue Procedure since the
10 8 See Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1979, 13 AKRON L. REv. 203, 241 (1979).
104 439 U.S. at 534-35. 24
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entire adjustment would be included in the year the method of accounting
was changed.
Part 3.12 allows the taxpayer to estimate the taxable net adjustments
where he uses the procedure under section 481(a) as required by part
3.04(2) or 3.04(3). Estimation is allowed only when the taxpayer's books
and records contain insufficient information to allow him to adequately
complete the requirements of section 481(a). If estimates are used, a
statement must be attached to Form 3115 (Declaration to Change Inventory
Methods) certifying that the records are insufficient and the information
supplied has been determined by the taxpayer using his best ability under
penalty of perjury.
Part 5.00 of the Revenue Procedure sets out the application procedure
to be used by the taxpayer. The original is filed with the taxpayer's timely
filed tax return or amended return. It must be filed, however, before the lapse
of an extended time period as allowed under section 6081. The copy must
be filed with the Commissioner at the national office. Form 3115 is also
required to contain four other items of information. First, the taxpayer
must state whether they are filing under part 3.04 as a voluntary change
or part 3.05 as an involuntary change. Second, he must demonstrate how
he computed the net "spread" adjustment under section 481 (a). Third, a
statement must be made concerning whether any pre-1954 Code adjustments
were made. And, fourth, the taxpayer must explain what time period he
used to compute the net adjustment under section 481 (a) and why that
time period was used.
10.00 Pension, Profit Sharing and Stock Ownership Plans
10.01 Advance Funding
A qualified pension plan must meet the requirements of minimum
funding as stated in section 412. The minimum funding requirements pro-
vide for the predetermined retirement benefits that will come due in the
future. The Service has no objection to one's contributing more than is
required for minimum funding. 1° Although the amount of the employer
deduction will not increase for any year in which more than the required
amount is funded, it may be an attractive investment technique in times
of high interest rates to a cash-rich corporation. By contributing in excess
of the amount required to be funded, a corporation can invest in high
yielding bonds and be able to generate tax-free income from these invest-
ments. In future years, section 404 (A) (1) (D) will allow the excess fund-
ing to be earned over and deducted to the extent of the maximum amount
deductible for that taxable year. The interest produced from the excess
funding will be required to be applied as a contribution in succeeding
2O Letter Ruling 7943131 (1979).
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years. Since section 404 provides for the carryover of employer's contribu-
tions, the qualified status of the pension plan should not be affected.1"
For example, consider a corporation required to contribute $60,000 per year
to meet the minimum funding requirements of its plan. If the corporation
contributes $100,000, only $60,000 will be deductible for that taxable
year. The $40,000 excess contribution plus the interest received on this
amount can be used in the following years and deducted to the extent of
the funding requirement.
The use of this investment technique will allow a corporation to
take advantage of high interest rates and the generation of tax free interest
that will reduce the amount of contributions in future years. Therefore,
advance funding can have the effect of lowering the overall cost of operating
a qualified pension plan.
It seems that if a qualified profit sharing plan has a dual purpose of
providing retirement benefits and accidental or health benefits, then the
taxability of such distributions will be determined by the circumstances
for the payment. For the plan to have a dual purpose it must be the em-
ployer's intent that the profit sharing plan also be an accident or health
plan. This intent can be evidenced by providing 100% vesting if an em-
ployee becomes totally and permanently disabled. Thus, a plan with less
than 100% vesting will not constitute a health or accident plan. Also it
should be noted that this disability payment should come before the em-
ployee is eligible to retire. If the employee had been eligible to retire before
his permanent disability, then the lump sum distribution may not be tax
free.
10.02 Disability Payouts
A lump sum distribution from a profit sharing plan paid under a dis-
ability provision may be tax free. In Wood v. United States,"°' a qualified
profit sharing plan called for twenty-five percent vesting after five years of
service and five percent each year of service thereafter. It also provided
that an employee would receive the full amount of his account (100%
vested) on retirement or termination due to a permanent disability. The tax-
payer at the time of his permanent disability had an eighty-five percent vested
right in his account and received a lump sum distribution of the full amount
in his account due to his permanent disability.
The issue in Wood was whether the distribution to the taxpayer was
excludable from gross income under section 105(c) as an amount received
under an accident or health plan or taxable under section 402(a) (1) as
a distribution of the taxpayer's share of earned profits. The intent of the
110 Rev. Rul. 74-467, 1974-2 C.B. 132,
111T 590 F.24 321 (9th Cir. 1979),
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employer is the major factor looked to in determining whether this profit
sharing plan constituted an accident or health plan. Here the employer
provided for 100% vesting due to permanent disability. The intent of the
employer in providing for 100% vesting upon a permanent disability caused
the court to hold that such a plan was in effect a combination profit sharing
plan and accident or health plan. The payment to the taxpayer was for
permanent loss of a bodily function and not taxable pursuant to section
105(c). The Service argued on appeal that only the fifteen percent non-vested
portion of the distribution should be subject to section 105(c) and that
the eighty-five percent vested was taxable pursuant to section 402(a) (1).
The Service's argument was not adopted since the payment was made as
a result of the taxpayer's disability in accordance with the employer's ac-
cident or health plan for the permanent loss of a bodily function and thus
was entirely excludable from gross income, even though the taxpayer had
an eighty-five percent vested right in the account at the time of payment.
In Masterson v. United States,"'° the employer had a similar profit
sharing plan in which an employee had a 100% vested right after ten years
of service. If an employee became permanently disabled, then he was en-
titled to 100% of his funds regardless of his vested right. The taxpayer had
a 100% vested right prior to his disability. The taxpayer then became per-
manently disabled before he was eligible for retirement. The taxpayer con-
tended that the distribution was excluded from gross income as a payment
made in accordance with an accident or health plan. The Service contended
that the termination of employment and not the disability causing the
termination triggered the lump sum distribution. The taxpayer relied on
the Wood case, which "focused on the circumstances in which the payments
were made, not the source of the funds."'09 Similarly, the intent of the
employer was to make the distribution because of taxpayer's disability.
The Service's argument that since the taxpayer had a 100% vested right
to the account that it should be taxable as a lump sum distribution would
lead to inequitable results since an employee disabled after a short period
of service would not be required to include the lump sum distribution as
income, whereas another employer who was fully vested would be re-
quired to include the lump sum distribution as income. The taxability of
the payments should turn on the circumstances in which the payments
were made, not when the disability occurred. Therefore, the holding in
both Woods and Masterson leaves the nature and taxability of the lump
sum distributions uncertain until the fund is disbursed.
10.03 Integration of Workers' Compensation Benefits
Section 401(a)(5) provides that a plan will not be discriminatory
08478 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. IMI. 1979).
109Id. at 455,
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merely because the contributions or benefits of or on behalf of the em-
ployees under the plan "differ because of any retirement benefits created
under state or federal law." Previous to the enactment of the Employee
Retirement and Income Security Act"' many pension plans integrated bene-
fits under state workers' compensation laws with the benefits from the
pension plan. Guided by section 401(a)(5), the Service in Revenue Rul-
ing 68-243... allowed a plan to offset benefits payable under a workers'
compensation law with benefits payable under a qualified pension plan.
After the enactment of ERISA, there was no expressed statutory
provision concerning the workers' compensation offset. Section 405(a)(5)
was modified because of ERISA but without any change to the relevant
provisions relied on by the Service in Revenue Ruling 68-243. Further-
more, section 411(a) requires "that an employee's right to his normal
retirement benefit is nonforfeitable upon the attainment of normal retire-
ment age." There are several permitted exceptions to this rule contained
in section 411(a) (3) but none relate to the benefits payable under work-
ers' compensation law.
In 1977, the Service adopted Treasury Regulation 1.411(a)-4(a)
which provided that "nonforfeitable rights are not considered to be for-
feitable by reason of the fact that they may be reduced to take into account
benefits which are provided under the Social Security Act or under any
other Federal or State law and which are taken into account in determining
plan benefits." This regulation parallels section 401(a) (5) and Revenue
Ruling 68-243 in that it allows for the offsetting of workers' compensation
benefits with benefits of the qualified pension plan. Nevertheless, various
suits have attacked workers' compensation offsets as being a forfeiture
that violates section 411 (a).
In Utility Workers Union v. Consumers Power Co."' the district
court overruled three of its previously decided cases allowing an offset
of workers' compensation benefits with benefits of a qualified pension plan.""
The court reasoned that since workers' compensation was not an expressed
exception under section 411 (a) (3), then Congress must not have intended
it to be a proper forfeiture of benefits. The court also dismissed Regulation
1.411 (a)-4(a) by saying the Secretary of the Treasury does not have au-
thority to make final interpretations of the statute. The court's decision
110 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 [here-
inafter cited as ERISA].
M11 1968-1 C.B. 157.
112 453 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
118See Bordine v. Evans Products Co., 453 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Pavlovic v.
Chrysler Corp., No. 7-70438 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 1978); Carlson v. Bundy Manufacturing
Co., No. 6-72274 (E.D. Mich, Aug. 18, 1977).
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has been argued on appeal and is awaiting a decision from the Sixth
Circuit.
Nevertheless, the court's decision in Utility Workers Union has been
followed by other district courts."' However the Third Circuit has reversed
two district court decisions1"5 upholding the validity of workers' compen-
sation offset in pension plans. To support its decision the Third Circuit
looked to Regulation 1.411(a)-4(a), saying the regulation was a legis-
lative rule which was as binding on the courts as a valid statute. The court
also relied upon Revenue Ruling 68-243"'1 and the express decision by
Congress not to modify the pre-existing rules under section 401(a) (5).
Furthermore, the Third Circuit looked at the legislative history of ERISA
and decided that Regulation 1.411(a)-4(a) was not contrary to the pro-
visions of ERISA as a whole.
The Third Circuit had one more obstacle to overcome before it could
allow the offsetting of workers' compensation benefits with the benefits
of a qualified pension plan. A New Jersey statute expressly provided that
workers' compensation benefits may not be offset with that of an employee's
retirement pension benefits. The Third Circuit ruled that ERISA section
514(a) preempts any and all state laws as applied to ERISA. Therefore,
the New Jersey statute was not applicable to the qualified pension plans
and the workers' compensation offset was allowed.
Although the Third Circuit has allowed the workers' compensation
offset, Congress has before it a bill" ' that, if enacted, would eliminate
this offset. However, absent congressional change it seems as if workers'
compensation offsets will be allowed with a qualified pension plan.
10.04 Limitation of Benefits Raised
When the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974118
was passed, the limitation on benefits for defined benefit plans was $75,000
and the maximum contribution to a defined contribution plan was $25,000.
Effective January 1, 1980, the limitation for the annual benefit under de-
fined benefit plans is $110,625 and the maximum annual addition to de-
fined contribution plans is $36,875. These limitations for the defined bene-
fit (section 415(b)(1)(A)) and the defined contribution (section 415
(c) (1)(A)) plans have been adjusted upward to reflect the increase in
.14See Stong v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 472 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Alessi v. Ray-
bestos-Manhattan, Inc., No. 78-0434 (D. N.J. Feb. 15, 1979); Bucynski v. General Motors
Corp., 456 F. Supp. 867 (D. NJ. 1978).
115 Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238 (3rd Cir. 1980) (reversing the Alessi
and Buczynski district court decisions).
116 1968-1 C.B. 157.
'T S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980).
I's Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829.
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the cost of living. Determination letters are not required to conform to
these new provisions.
10.05 Professional Corporation-Pension
In a 1978 decision dealing with a fact pattern arising prior to the
enactment of ERISA, the Tax Court held'19 that two professional corpo-
rations which formed a fifty-fifty partnership did not have to cover the
partnership's employees under either of the corporations' pension plans be-
cause neither corporation controlled the partnership. For purposes of mini-
mum participation standards the test for control is defined as greater than
fifty percent interest.
The Tax Court took the same view in a case arising after the enact-
ment of ERISA. 12' There one doctor had formed a professional corporation
and entered into a fifty-fifty partnership with another doctor. The pro-
fessional corporation adopted a pension plan that did not cover the partner-
ship's employees. The Service contended that this plan was not qualified
under section 401 because the test from 414(b) and (c) was not the ex-
clusive test for common control. The Tax Court disagreed and held that
the pension plan was qualified because the exclusive test for determining
whether employees of affiliated entities should be aggregated for purposes
of anti-discrimination provisions is the common control test under section
414(b) and (c). The Tax Court followed its pre-ERISA decision in say-
ing that for purposes of determining control, the partner must have a
greater than fifty percent interest in the partnership.
Considering this to be a loophole, Congress has introduced two bills
that will reverse this result, House Bill 6140 and Senate Bill 2128.11
These proposed bills would add an additional subsection to section
414. The proposed subsection would require testing of qualifications
for discrimination, participation, vesting, and limits on contributions and
benefits with all employees of an adjunct professional organization, and
all employees of the professional organizations which are related to such
adjunct professional organization, being treated as employed by a single
employer. A professional organization is related to an adjunct professional
organization if: 1) the professional organization regularly uses the services
of the adjunct professional organization or is regularly associated with
the adjunct professional organization in performing professional services
for third persons; 2) one or more of the individuals performing
professional services for the professional organization (or one or
more of the owners of such professional organization) owns an interest
in the adjunct professional organization; and, 3) twenty-five percent or more
120 Thomas Kidde, M.D., Inc., 69 T.C. 1055 (1978).
120 Lloyd M. Garland, M.D., Inc., 73 T.C. 5 (1979).
121 H.R. 6140, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980); S. 2128, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980).
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of the interests in the adjunct professional organization is owned by per-
sons described in subparagraph (2). If this bill is enacted, the change will
be effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 1979.
The proposed legislation does not upset the use of service bureau
personnel to narrow the coverage of a qualified plan. This method requires
the professional corporation to subscribe with an unrelated party to pro-
vide them with rented employees. However, the service bureau must in
actuality perform more than a payroll service. The service bureau must
have control and direction over each employee in the performance of serv-
ices, manner of performance, hiring, firing, place of employment, and work-
ing hours. If the subscribing corporation has the control of the service
bureau's employees, as in Edward L. Burnetta, O.D., P.A. v. Commission-
er, 2 2 an employer-employee relationship will exist between the professional
corporation and the service bureau personnel. Therefore, these employees
will be included in the minimum coverage requirements of section 401.
A recent letter ruling 23 warns of another situation that may cause
the service bureau personnel to be included as employees of the subscribing
corporation. This may occur when the subscribing corporation had previously
employed a person who now works for the service bureau without any
definite termination of the employer-employee relationship that formerly
existed with the subscribing corporation. The letter ruling also states that
"~a contractual arrangement is not determinative of an employer-employee
relationship when the realities of the situation contradict the terms of the
contract."' 24 The determination of the employer will be resolved in light
of the facts and circumstances of each relationship. The length of time
that one person works for any subscribing corporation may be a significant
factor in determining his employer.
This letter ruling further holds that if the subscribing corporation
does not have control over these rented employees, the coverage require-
ments of sections 401(d)(3) and 410 (b)(1) will not be applicable to
them. The situation under consideration in the letter ruling was similar
to the one discussed in Revenue Ruling 75-41.111 The service bureau re-
cruited, tested, hired and instructed the workers involved. The service
bureau had contracts with the rented employees which subscribers could
not alter. These factors indicated that an employer-employee relationship
existed with the service bureau and not with the subscribing corporation.
Such rented employees may be excluded from the subscriber's pension or
profit sharing plan.
2268 T.C. 387 (1977).
123Letter Ruling 7947002 (1978).
124 Id. citing Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
125 1975-1 C.B. 323.
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11.00 Corporations
11.01 Dividend In Kind
Section 311(a) states that the distribution of dividends in kind is
generally tax free to the corporation. Because of a recent Tax Court decis-
ion, 2 there now exist more conditions to receive such tax free treatment.
With the Tax Court decision in Bush Brothers, corporate distributors
of dividends in kind who assist in the negotiation for the sale of the in
kind dividends are not entitled to section 511(a) tax free treatment. The
Tax Court in disallowing section 311(a) treatment referred to a line of
pre-section 311 cases which had dealt with similar issues. The Tax Court
looked to a Ninth Circuit decision holding that where there was a ready
market for the dividend property, the resulting gain was attributed to the
corporation, even though the corporation had not participated in the sale. 2 '
The Tax Court also looked to one of its own 1964 decisions that imputed
gain on the dividends in kind to the distributing corporation where no
business purpose existed for the distribution and where the property was
expected to be immediately sold.2 8
The Bush Brothers case concerned a family-run food processing busi-
ness where certain contracts for navy beans were selected for dividend
distribution. When dividends in kind were declared on the beans, the divi-
dends were assigned to bean suppliers and quickly sold. The result was
that the beans never physically moved to the shareholders since the cor-
poration had already negotiated their sale.
The Service ruled that the distribution resulted in taxable gain to the
corporation. The Tax Court on review found a lack of a substantial busi-
ness purpose in the distribution and characterized the transaction as being
"motivated primarily by tax avoidance."" 9 The court further found a lack
of free will available to the shareholders in the disposal of the dividends
as the corporation had negotiated their sale prior to declaration. The dis-
senting judges saw the corporation as having the right to make such dis-
tributions tax free since the shareholders would be taxed on the full value
of the distribution regardless.
11.02 Liquidation-Basis Valuation
The general rule of section 334 is that a corporation that receives
property in a complete liquidation of another corporation will carry over
the basis of the property from the transferor. An exception to this general
rule is section 334(b)(2) which allows a stepped up basis for the assets,
120 Bush Brothers & Co., 73 T.C. 424 (1979).
127 United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952).
128A.B.C.D. Lands, Inc., 41 T.C. 840 (1964).
120 73 T.C. at 437.
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usually equal to the purchase price of the stock, if the subsidiary is liquidated
within two years pursuant to a plan and certain other requirements are met.
Prior to the enactment of section 334(b) (2), courts utilized the judicial
Kimbell-Diamond doctrine."' The doctrine was created to alleviate the
unequal tax consequences to a corporation which purchased the assets of
another corporation with the purchase price becoming the basis of the
assets pursuant to section 1012, and a corporation which purchased the
stock of the other corporation and then liquidated the subsidiary with the sub-
sidiary's basis in the assets being carried over. Under the Kimbell-
Diamond doctrine the purchase of stock of a corporation followed
by the liquidation of the corporation acquired was viewed as a single trans-
action and the acquiring corporation would receive the purchase price of
the stock as the basis of the assets instead of being able to carry over the
basis from the subsidiary.
The question that arose after the enactment of section 334(b)(2)
was whether the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine' would still be applicable if a
corporation did not meet the specific requirements of section 334(b)(2).
In 1968, the Court of Claims' held that Congress did not intend to elimi-
nate the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine by enacting section 334(b) (2). The
court's rationale was that substance should control over form and section
334(b)(2) merely gave a taxpayer an exception for obtaining the cost
basis for the assets without having to show an intent to acquire the assets.
The Court of Claims also felt that, since section 334 (b) (2) was applicable
to corporations only and not to individuals, Congress had intended the doc-
trine to survive as applied to corporations as well as individuals.
In 1970"'1 and again in 19731" the Ninth Circuit held that section
334(b) (2) has eliminated the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine. Both cases in-
volved transactions that specifically qualified under section 334(b)(2).
The Fifth Circuit was faced with a case"' in which the transaction was
not qualified under section 334(b) (2) because the stock was not acquired
by purchase, but by a section 351 exchange. In this case, the acquiring
corporation purchased the stock of the acquired corporation, then trans-
ferred the stock to a new subsidiary. This subsidiary then liquidated the
acquired corporation. The taxpayer clearly intended this transaction to
qualify under section 334(b)(2) but blundered so as to disqualify the
131 Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Comm'r, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951).
131 The IRS manual lists the use of the Kimball-Diamond doctrine as "prime issue," one that
it will litigate and will not usually concede or compromise.
32 American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
"33 Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 429 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1970).
134 Pacific Transport Co. v. Comm'r, 483 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1973).
135 Chrome Plate, Inc. v. District Director of Internal Revenue (In re Chrome Plate, Inc.)
614 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1980).
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transaction. The taxpayer argued that the doctrine should apply because of
its intent to qualify under section 334(b) (2) and because the substance
of the transaction should control over the form.
The Fifth Circuit followed an earlier Tax Court decision l'3 holding
that the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine had been abolished and the only
exception to 334(b)(1) was 334(b)(2). The Fifth Circuit thought it
was apparent that Congress intended to codify the Kimbell-Diamond doc-
trine completely within section 334(b) (2). "' Although the Fifth Circuit
recognized that this may lead to some inequitable results where the form
controls over the substance, it said that since no exceptions were acknowl-
edged by Congress that it was bound by section 334(b)(2). Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit held:
definitely and absolutely that the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine is extinct
under the 1954 code regarding corporate taxpayers. The doctrine has
been codified in section 334(b) (2), which is now the sole exception to
the application of a carryover basis to corporations following the com-
plete liquidation of another corporation. 8
11.03 Liquidation-Reorganization
The Fifth Circuit in General Housewares Corp. v. United Statesas9 and
its companion case, Sellers v. United States,' ° has decided not to follow the
Court of Claims decision in FEC Liquidating Corp. v. United States...
by allowing a corporation to first adopt a plan of complete liquidation
under section 337 and then prior to liquidation undergo a type "C" reorgan-
ization under section 368(a). This will allow a double tax break to the
corporation and shareholder not previously allowed under the only other
reported case addressing the issue, FEC.
In General, the corporation, (Olivier) first adopted a plan for com-
plete liquidation within twelve months. Initially this plan called for the
transfer of the corporations only asset (stock in a third corporation) to
the acquiring corporation, U.S.I., for shares of U.S.I. stock. This step
was clearly tax free as part of a reorganization. Oliver then sold
off part of the newly acquired U.S.I. stock at a profit. Olivier used this
profit to satisfy its liabilities and then pursuant to plan, completed the liqui-
dation by distributing the remaining U.S.I. stock and assets (cash) to its
shareholders. The court in a break from the FEC precedent, determined
136 International State Bank v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 173 (1978).
2t3 614 F.2d at 1000.
138 Id.
189615 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980).
140 615 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1980).
21, 548 F.2d 924 (Ct. C1. 1977).
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that Olivier, the liquidating corporation, was not liable for taxes on its
gain from the sale of the stock acquired during the reorganization step.
The court in General did, however, rule that the cash "boot" received by
the shareholders at liquidation was taxable as a dividend." 2
The Service argued, as it had argued successfully in FEC, that sec-
tions 337 and 368(a) were mutually exclusive. The corporation could not
take advantage of both the provisions under the complete liquidation and
reorganization where the liquidation was an essential step in the reorganiza-
tion. Their contentions were based on the different purposes placed on the
two sections: reorganization requires a continuity of proprietary interests
while complete liquidation requires the cessation of all business.1"3 Since
both sections could not apply concurrently, the Service contended that the
liquidating corporation should therefore be taxed on the gain from the sale
of the stock acquired through reorganization.
In arriving at its decision the court distinguished the case at hand
from FEC, which had not allowed the concurrent use of liquidation and
reorganization provisions, on the basis of what percent of interest the former
shareholders had in the reorganized corporation. While in FEC the former
shareholders had a substantial share (50%), in General the former share-
holders had less than a one percent interest in the reorganized corporation."'
Because of this small interest held and because the court determined
the two sections were in fact not mutually exclusive, it allowed the con-
current use of the liquidation and "C" reorganization provisions. Thus, the
corporation could not be taxed on its gain from the sale of stock during
the reorganization step.
11.04 State and Local Taxes
The unitary method is a method of taxation which allows the state
to take into consideration all of a corporation's divisions, departments and
subsidiaries and treat them as one "unit" for taxation purposes, regardless
of how the corporation itself treats them.
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont"' the Supreme
Court allowed the State of Vermont to determine Mobil's net income by the
use of the "unitary method." The conflict arose when Vermont included as
income, amounts received by Mobil as dividends from that corporation's
foreign subsidiaries and affiliates. Mobil argued that its Vermont business,
which involved distribution only, had an insufficient connection with the
foreign subsidiaries which produced the dividend income, and because of
142 615 F.2d 1056, but see 615 F.2d at 1068 where 'boot' was held to be nontaxable.
43 Id. at 1060.
24' Id. at 1062.
'45 100 S. Ct. 1223 (1980).
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that insufficient connection, Vermont should not include that income in
determining Mobil's state tax liability. Mobil contended that only the state
where the corporation was domiciled, in this case New York, should be
allowed to tax foreign income.
The Court disagreed, stating that Vermont could include all of Mobil's
foreign dividend income in determining the corporation's net income unless
the corporation could show that the foreign dividends were earned by way
of "activities unrelated to the sale of petroleum products in [Ver-
mont]."'" Had Mobil met its burden in showing that the activities were
unrelated, Vermont could not have included the foreign income in determin-
ing Mobil's net income for state tax purposes.
In June of 1980, the Court relied on its Mobil decision in deciding
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue. "7 The Exxon case dealt with
Wisconsin's tax law which allowed the state to use Exxon's interstate in-
come as well as intrastate income to determine the total corporate income
subject to state taxation.
Exxon's arguments were similar to those raised by Mobil. The corpo-
ration contended that its marketing of gasoline in Wisconsin was insuffiently
related to the corporation's exploration and refining activities in other
states and that only the intrastate income should be considered for state
tax purposes.
The Court disagreed as it had done in Mobil. The justices in a unani-
mous decision upheld the Wisconsin law which allowed the state to take
into account both in and out-of-state income in determining that which is
apportionable to the state and thus taxable. The Court stated that regardless
of how the corporation treats its internal departments, they are all con-
sidered part of the "unitary business" and can be looked to by a state in
determining tax liability.
11.05 Type B Reorganizations
One way in which a corporation can acquire another corporation in
a tax free transaction is an exchange of voting stock of the acquiring cor-
poration for the voting stock of the acquired corporation. This type of
reorganization is provided for in section 368(a)(1)(B) and is referred to
as a Type B reorganization. A Type B reorganization is tax free only if
the acquisition of the acquired corporation's stock is made "solely for...
the voting stock" of the acquiring corporation.
In 1968, ITT wanted to acquire Hartford Fire Insurance Company.
Late in 1968, ITT acquired eight percent of Hartford's stock for cash. In May,
146 Id. at 1232.
147 100 S. Ct. 2109 (1980).
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1970, ITT acquired ninety-five percent of Hartford's stock for its voting
preferred stock pursuant to an exchange offer. Prior to acquiring Hartford's
stock in the exchange offer, ITT disposed of its eight percent interest that it
had previously purchased for cash.
The Service contended that because of the eight percent interest in
stock purchased for cash, the entire exchange is taxable as it did not meet
the "solely for . . . the voting stock" requirement of section 368 (a) (1) (B).
In Reeves' and Pierson,"' both the Tax Court and a district court
held that the prior purchase of stock would not disqualify the exchange
as a Type B reorganization. The courts interpreted the Type B reorganiza-
tion to require only the acquisition of "control" of the acquired corpora-
tion "solely for .. . the voting stock" of the acquiring corporation. Section
368(c) defines "control" as possessing at least eighty percent of the voting
power and total stock of a corporation. Since ITT acquired over eighty
percent of Hartford in exchange solely for its voting preferred stock, then
it was a qualified tax free Type B reorganization. Therefore, this holding
allows up to twenty per cent of the consideration to be non-stock if eighty per
cent of the acquired corporation is solely for the acquiring corporation's vot-
ing stock.
Because of the number of Hartford's shareholders with diverse resi-
dences, the Service appealed these decisions to the First, Third, Fourth and
Ninth Circuits. In Chapman v. Commissioner50 and Heverly v. Commission-
er," the First and Third Circuits have reversed the Tax Court and district
court decisions and accepted the Service's view.
Both courts considered the legislative and judicial history of section
368 (a) (1) (B). The issue was how broadly to interpret the term "acquisition"
in section 368 (a) (1) (B). The Service contended that the term included
both the cash purchase of the stock as well as the exchange offer. The tax-
payer contended only the exchange of stock was itself an acquisition which
gave ITT control of Hartford solely for the exchange of ITT voting stock.
In Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp.' the Supreme Court said that
the word "solely leaves no leeway. Voting stock plus some other consider-
ation does not meet the statutory requirement."' 3 Revenue Ruling 75-123154
states that the requirement of a Type B reorganization will not be met
if eighty percent of the acquired corporation's outstanding stock is ac-
34'C.E. Graham Reeves, 71 T.C. 727 (1979).
149Pierson v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 957 (D. Del. 1979).
150 618 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1980).
152 621 F.2d 1227 (3rd Cir. 1980).
'52315 U.S. 194 (1942).
153Id. at 198.
154 1975-1 C.B. 115.
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quired for voting stock and the remaining twenty percent is purchased for
cash.
The Third Circuit rejected the lower court's decision "that the voting
stock requirement necessarily relates to the control requirement. Instead we
deem the stock requirement to have been directed to preserving the con-
tinuity of interest."' 55 In order for the continuity of interest requirement
to be effective, Congress has required that only voting stock can be ex-
changed in a Type B reorganization. This policy has prevailed for fifty
years, and it is for the legislature to change it.
11.06 Waiver of Family Attribution Rules
In Revenue Ruling 80-26156 the Service rejected the First Circuit's
ruling in Haft Trust v. Commissioner,"'7 that family hostility could be con-
sidered in mitigation of family attribution rules in determining whether a
stock redemption will be given dividend or capital gains treatment. The
First Circuit had relied on the Tax Court's holding in Estate of Squier v.
Commissioner.' Although the Service had originally supported Estate of
Squier,"' in 1978 it withdrew its acquiesence thereto and entered a non-
acquiesence in its place.'
Section 302(b) (1) provides that redemptions "not essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend" will be treated as a sale or exchange, subject to capital
gains treatment, rather than as a dividend. In Estate of Squier, where a
closely held corporation had redeemed a portion of the estate's shares,
the Tax Court found a "sharp cleavage" between the executor of the estate
and members of the Squier family who still owned shares in the corpo-
ration. 6' Although under section 318 (3) (a) the family members' shares
were attributable to the estate, the court held that the estate's actual loss
of control over the corporation, rather than its actual or constructive own-
ership of shares, was decisive in determining whether the redemption was
essentially equivalent to a dividend. 6
In Haft Trust a closely held corporation redeemed all of the shares
owned by several trusts. The trusts held shares for the benefit of the chil-
dren of an officer-shareholder of the corporation. The trusts were created
by said shareholder's father-in-law and the redemption of the shares was
155 621 F.2d at 1243.
156 1980-4 I.R.B. 7.
157510 F.2d 43 (Ist Cir. 1975).
158 35 T.C. 950 (1961).
159 1961-2 C.B. 5.
130 1978-2 C.B. 4.
161 35 T.C. at 955.
162 id.
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an outgrowth of said shareholder's bitter divorce. Under section 318 the
trusts constructively owned a slightly higher interest in the corporation
after the redemption than they did prior thereto." Citing Estate of Squier,
the First Circuit found that the attribution rules of section 318 were not
the sole criteria in determining dividend equivalency under section 302
(b) (1).'" Because there had been no finding in the trial court on the
issue of family discord, the case was remanded back to the Tax Court with
instructions to reconsider the case in light of the fact that family discord
may negate the possibility of continued control over the corporation after
redemption of shares.
The Service in Revenue Ruling 80-26, as it did in the Haft Trust case,
cites the Supreme Court case of United States v. Davis"' as support for the
proposition that the attribution rules of section 318 are determinative in
measuring the dividend equivalency of a redemption under section 302
(b) (1) regardless of actual loss of control resulting from family discord.
The Service's interpretation of Davis however, significantly expands upon
the language therein. In Davis, a taxpayer who caused his family owned
corporation to redeem his preferred shares argued: (1) that the attribution
rules of section 318 do not apply under section 302(b)(1); and, (2)
that where a redemption is motivated by a bona fide business purpose
it is not essentially equivalent to a dividend. The Supreme Court how-
ever, disagreed, holding that section 318 applies to all subparagraphs of
section 302 including section 302(b)(1) and that business purpose is
irrelevant thereunder."6 Family discord was not an issue in Davis and was
never addressed by the Court.
Davis is in no way inconsistent with Halt Trust or Estate of Squier,
both of which also held that the attribution rules were applicable in de-
termining dividend equivalency under section 302 (b)(1). The latter cases
simply held that family discord must also be considered under that section
in order to determine whether an actual loss of control of the corporation
resulted from the redemption."' Davis did not hold that the rules of at-
tribution are the sole criteria under section 302(b) (1). In fact, Davis held
that in order "to qualify for treatment under [section 302(b)(1)], a re-
demption must result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's pro-
portionate interest in the corporation." '
The strongest support for the position taken in Revenue Ruling 80-26
163 510 F.2d at 46.
1641d. at 48.
105 397 U.S. 301 (1970), rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970).
166 397 U.S. at 305-06.
167 510 F.2d at 48; 35 T.C. at 955-56.
168 397 U.S. at 313.
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is in the legislative history of section 318 which indicates that the section
is to provide "precise standards whereby under specific circumstances, a
shareholder may be considered as owning stock held by members of his
family. . . ."I" This does not of itself however, indicate that family discord
and actual loss of control or reduction of proportionate interest in the cor-
poration should not be considered where attribution may be applicable. In
spite of this however, the Service has ruled that family discord will not be
considered in determining the dividend equivalency of a redemption under
section 302 (b) (I).
Subject to certain requirements, section 302(c)(2) allows waiver
of the attribution rules of section 318 in the event of a redemption of all of
the shares held by a family member in a family owned corporation. By
waiving the attribution rules, distributions upon a redemption of a family
member's shares can qualify for capital gains rather than dividend treatment.
In Dunn v. Commissioner,' ° the Second Circuit criticized Treasury Regula-
tion 1.302-4(d) which strictly applied the requirements of section 302
(c) (2).
Section 302(c) (2) waives the attribution rules for the former share-
holder if immediately after the redemption he: (1) owns no interest in
the corporation other than that of a creditor; (2) acquires no such interest
in the corporation for ten years after the redemption; and, (3) agrees
to notify the Internal Revenue Service if he does acquire such an interest.
Regulation 1.302-4(d) provides that, if as a result of the redemption agree-
ment the former shareholder holds debt instruments of the corporation
and pursuant to that agreement the corporation is permitted to discharge
the debt in payments the amount of certainty of which depend upon the
corporation's earnings, then the shareholder has retained a proprietary
interest and the payments on the instruments will be considered dividends.
In Dunn the taxpayer's shares in a family owned auto distributorship were re-
deemed in exchange for corporate notes issued by the distributorship.
Because the auto maker (General Motors) with which the distributorship
dealt imposed certain working capital requirements on all of its distributors,
it was necessary for the taxpayer's distributorship to retain the right to
postponed payment on the notes if necessary in order to maintain working
capital at the required levels. Relying on Regulation 1.302-4(d) the
Service asserted that the taxpayer had retained a proprietary interest in
the distributorship and contended that the payments on the notes were
dividends.
The Tax Court. 1 however, held that Regulation 1.302-4(d) was
109 H.R. REP. No. 1837, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
170615 F.2d 578 (2nd Cir. 1980).
171 Herbert A. Dunn v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 715 (1978).
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intended* to apply only where the redemption agreement itself was the
source of the contingency upon corporate earnings of the amount of cer-
tainty of payment. The Tax Court thus found that Regulation 1.302-4(d)
could not be applied where the contingency of payments was imposed by
a third party rather than by the parties to the redemption agreement. The
Second Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the contingency of payments upon
earnings did not affect the certainty of payments under Regulation 1.302-4
(d) but, rather, affected only the time of payment. Hence, though the in-
terest retained by the taxpayer may not have been a classic creditor's in-
terest, it was sufficiently close to qualify under section 302(c) (2) for waiver
of the attribution rules.
12.00 Subchapter S Corporation
12.01 Ownership by Children
In Fundenberg v. Commissioner7 2 the Service challenged the validity
of minor children's substantial ownership of a Subchapter S corporation.
An opthalmologist had set up a Sub-S corporation and transferred ninety
percent of the corporate stock to his six minor children. He then appointed
his wife as the custodian of the shares for the children.
To determine the actual ownership the court relied on a four part
test. First, did the custodial parent act in the interest of the minor children.
Second, did the parents exercise control of the stock. Third, did the parents
receive any economic enjoyment from the stock. Fourth, did the parents
deal at arm's length with the corporation and the children in obtaining loans
and in repaying them.""3
The court held that the parents were the real owners of the stock and
the entire corporate income was attributed to them."' The children failed
the actual ownership test in that: the father retained complete control of
the business; loans had been made to the parents without repayment
agreements; and, the custodial parent had given some of the shares to a
new born child, thereby substantially affecting the other children's in-
terests.""
13.00 Estate Planning
13.01 Basis of Property
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 19761 all property which had been
transferred to a beneficiary as a result of the death of the owner took a
172 1980 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,113 (1980).
173Id. at 607.
1t4 Id. at 608.
175 Id.
1' Pub, L, 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525 (1976).
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stepup in basis equal to fair market value at date of death. In the alternative
the property could be valued six months after the date of death and this
would become the basis to the beneficiary. The Tax Reform Act of 1976,
however, substituted the concept of "carryover basis" for inherited property
so that in fact the decedent's basis would be handed over to the beneficiary.177
This, of course, would mean that at such time as the beneficiary disposed
of appreciated property by sale, taxable income would be generated. After
much objection by the bar associations, the Society of Certified Public
Accountants, trust officers and the American Banking Association, Con-
gress relented and as part of the Energy Tax Act of 1978178 declared a
moratorium on carryover basis. This moratorium was finalized by the Crude
Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 198017 which eliminated carryover basis
and reinstated the stepped up basis. The stepup in basis is retroactive to the
estates of all decedents dying after December 31, 1976.
Under the carryover basis rule, if the basis of property in the hands
of the decedent was higher than the fair market value of the property at
the date of death, sale by the estate or beneficiary resulted in a taxable
loss. Because of potential inequities to estates of decedents who had re-
lied on the application of the carryover basis rule in planning their estates,
the Windfall Profit Tax Act in repealing the carryover basis rule permitted
the executor or the administrator of the estate of a decedent who died
after December 31, 1976 and before November 7, 1978 to elect whether
to use the carryover basis or the stepped up basis. This election had to be
made prior to July 31, 1980 and once made it was irrevocable. Additionally,
the basis of all property acquired from the decedent had to be determined
by the elected basis. This election would be beneficial for property which
had decreased in value at the date of death as compared with the adjusted
basis in the hands of the decedent.
13.02 Disclaimers
In Letter Ruling 801501418° the Service stated that section 2518(c)
does not permit a qualified disclaimer of a partial interest in property, ex-
cept where the property is severable. The Service said that "severable prop-
erty is property which can be separated from other property to which it is
joined and which, after severance, maintains a complete and independent
existence."''
The ruling was given in regards to a husband and wife (A and B)
who had executed mutual wills providing that the residue of their property
177 Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1872.
178 Pub. L. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978).
79 Pub. L. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980).
180 Letter Ruling 8015014 (1979).
181 Id,
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was to pass to the surviving spouse and if the spouse predeceased the testa-
tor, all of the real estate, household furnishings and personal effects would
pass to two of their children (C and D) as trustees for A and B's five chil-
dren. The residue of the surviving spuose's property would go to the five
children in equal shares upon the surviving spouse's death. A died; within
nine months B died, and C and D were appointed co-executors for both
estates. C and D thereupon petitioned and received the local court's ap-
proval to allow B's estate to disclaim a $20,000 savings account plus
$25,000 of a $37,000 savings account. As a result of the disclaimer, the
money passed outright as part of the residue to A and B's children in
equal shares.
The Service said that generally, a qualified disclaimer must be one
that disclaims an entire interest in the property. "However, a disclaimant
shall not be treated as making a disclaimer of a partial interest in property
if the disclaimer relates to severable property and the disclaimant makes
a qualified disclaimer with respect to a portion of these items."' The
$25,000 was found to be severable property and qualified. An individual
would probably not be able to make a qualified disclaimer of a fractional
portion of a building, for example, under this rationale, because the property
would not be severable.
Section 2518(b) (4) (B) also requires that the disclaimed property
pass to a person other than the one making the disclaimer. Her6 C and D
were found not to be in violation of section 2518 (b) (4) (B) where they
are "not receiving an interest which they would not have received in the
absence of a disclaimer." 8 ' The Service also considered it important that
C and D had no discretion in the distributing the property, and that C and
D were acting in a fiduciary capacity.
13.03 General Power of Appointment
The Second Circuit in Alperstein v. Commissioner,' has agreed with
the Third185 and Ninth Circuitsls that a general power of appointment over
trust property held by a decedent will cause the trust property to be in-
cluded in her estate, even though she was incompetent and therefore unable
to exercise the power under state law.
In A lperstein, a husband had established a testamentary trust for the
benefit of his wife. The trust was to contain the maximum benefit from
the marital deduction under section 2056. The wife was granted a testa-
mentary power over the trust, with a default provision in favor of the chil-
82 Id.
183 Id.
184 613 F.2d 1213 (2nd Cir. 1979).
185 Pennsylvania Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 382 (3rd Cir. 1979).
1a8 Fish v. United States, 432 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1970).
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dren. However, for some time prior to the husband's death and until the
time of her own death the wife lacked the capacity to execute a will under
state law, and was thus legally incapable of exercising the power.
Under Revenue Rulings 55-518' s1 and 75-350,188 the husband's estate
was clearly permitted to take the marital deduction even though the wife
was incompetent and unable to exercise the general power. The wife's
estate argued, however, that the value of the trust property is not includ-
ible in her estate because she was never able to exercise the power due
to her mental condition.
The Second Circuit held that the property subject to the power was
part of the wife's estate even though she was unable to exercise the power
by virtue of her incompetency. The court reasoned that "the operative
verb in § 2041 (a) (2) is 'has'. . . and [the wife] 'had' a general power of
appointment at the time of her death."' 89
The three circuits faced with this issue have all emphasized the creation
of the power and did not consider important the probability that the power
would be exercised. Such reasoning conforms to the intent of the legislature in
creating a unified gift and estate tax structure. To accept taxpayer's argument
would allow the property to escape "estate tax at the time of the death of
the donor of the power because the competency of the donee is immaterial
and also at the time of the death of the donee because competency is held
to be crucial.""'
13.04 Life Insurance
The Eighth Circuit in Estate of Robert B. Margrave v. Commissioner9'
affirmed a Tax Court decision"9 2 that allows the settlor of a revocable trust
a substantial degree of flexibility and control during his lifetime over the
disposition of the proceeds of an insurance policy at his death without
bringing the proceeds into the settlor's gross estate.
In Margrave, the husband created a revocable intervivos trust, with
a bank as trustee. The wife later took out a life insurance policy on her
husband, naming the bank, in its capacity of trustee of the trust created
by her husband, as the primary beneficiary of the policy. There was no
arrangement between the husband and wife as to the disposition of the
policy or its proceeds, and the wife made all the premium payments and
retained the right to change the beneficiary.
117 1955-2 C.B. 384.
188 1975-2 C.B. 366.
189 613 F.2d at 1215.
190 Id. at 1218.
19' 618 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1980).
"9271 T.C. 13 (1978),
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The Service made two unsuccessful arguments on appeal. The first
was that there existed sufficient "incidents of ownership" to cause inclusion
of the insurance policy in the settlor's gross estate under section 2042(2).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument upon finding
that the settlor's power was subject to the absolute discretion of his wife
by her ability to change the beneficiary or revoke the policy. The second
argument made was that the settlor's power to modify or revoke the trust
constituted a "general power of appointment" and should therefore be
included in the settlor's gross estate under section 2041. The court held
that although decedent-settlor did possess a general power of appointment
by virtue of his ability to modify or revoke the trust, no property interest
attached to the power. The settlor had only a power over an expectancy
since his wife could change the beneficiary, and section 2041 will not
cause a mere expectancy to be included in an estate.
This decision could give a settlor of a great deal of control over the pro-
ceeds of a life insurance policy without bringing the proceeds into his gross
estate. A pitfall may arise, however, where the family relationship is not
harmonious. In such a situation the beneficiary of the life insurance policy
is likely to be changed leaving the trust with no assets.
13.05 Redemption
Section 303 permits a closely held corporation to redeem shares owned
by a decedent's estate and avoid dividend treatment to the extent the re-
demption does not exceed death taxes and funeral and administration ex-
penses. If a redemption satisfies the requirements of section 303 it is given
capital gains treatment. This favorable treatment of section 303 may be
lost, however, where a redemption that qualifies for capital gains treatment
under another section of the code occurs within the section 303(b)(1)
time limit of thirty-nine months.
Treasury Regulation 1.303-2 states that where there is more than
one redemption of stock within the thirty-nine month time limit, the dis-
tributions therefrom shall be applied against the maximum amount quali-
fied for section 303 treatment in the order that they occur. Thus, even if
a redemption of an estate's shares qualified for capital gains treatment under
another section of the Code (e.g., section 302(b)) such redemption would
reduce the amount by which subsequent redemptions could qualify for
such treatment under section 303.
In Revenue Ruling 79-401193 the Service indicated that this principle
also applies to distributions in liquidations. The ruling dealt with an es-
tate that owned controlling interests in two closely held corporations. The
shares held in one corporation satisfied the fifty percent of net gross estate
1'9 1979-2 C.B. 128.
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value test of section 303 (b) (2) and the shares owned in the other cor-
poration were grouped together with those of the first under the same
section. Death taxes and expenses amounted to $150,000. One of the cor-
porations was completely liquidated and the resulting distribution of $100,000
qualified for capital gains treatment under section 331(c) as well as under
section 303. The second corporation redeemed some of the estate's shares
and distributed $150,000. The Service held that only $50,000 (the excess
of the amount of the death taxes and expenses over the amount received
in the liquidating distribution prior thereto) was qualified for capital gain
treatment under section 303. If the shares of the two corporations had
not been grouped together, the redemption in liquidation under section
331 might have been considered separately from the redemption of the
second corporation's shares under section 303. The Service, however, ruled
that the grouping together of the shares under section 303(b)(2) was not
elective.
In order to avoid this problem in the timing of redemptions, redemp-
tions that do not qualify for capital gains treatment under sections of the
Code other than 303 should be made prior to any other distributions that
will be made within the thirty-nine month time limit. Under this approach,
the benefit of section 303 would not be lost by making a redemption that
would reduce the amount of distributions from redemption that qualify
under section 303 for capital gains treatment even though they qualify
for such treatment under other sections.
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